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BOOK REVIEWS 
TWO REVIEWS OF: 
Selective Nontreatment 
of Handicapped Newborns 
Robert F. Weir 
Oxford University Press, 200 Madison Ave., New York, NY 10016, 1 98 xii + 
275 pp., $27. 9 5 . 
I. 
(Reprinted with permission of The Thomist.) 
For the past 15 years, Western society has witnessed the progressive •valua· 
tion of innocent, troublesome human life. Roe v. Wade gave women the le , d right 
to devalu e and destroy innocent unborn human life . But this right could , Jt long 
be restricted to pregnant women alone, for the Baby Doe cases extended t l.is right 
to others and gave them the legal right to devalue and ·terminate innocent, : o uble· 
som e newborn human lives. The Clarence Herbert case provided physicir:·1s with 
the legal right to prematurely shorten the lives of difficult adult un c< •1scious 
patients, and in the summ er of 1984, we await the outcome of the M ,[ter of 
Claire Conroy to see if American courts will give physicians, fa mily me m • e rs and 
institutions the legal right to shorten the Jives of the chronically ill, bed ri de n and 
handicapped . Robert Weir 's book marks the epitome of the current secu iJr craze 
to deval u e and eliminate innocent human life. This book is not remarka bl•! for its 
scholarly contribution, bu t for its audacity in arguing for the direct int . n tional 
killin g of seriously ill newborns, and also because Oxford University Press has 
wrapped 'its mantle around this philosophy. 
This is not an ill-informed book. Weir demonstrates that he knows a g1 eat deal 
about newborn intensive care units and co~genital diseases. He studies th e historY 
of the practice of infanticide and notes that infanticide has been regula rl y prac· 
ticed by society t hroughout history to solve social problems. He wrongly implies 
that the Catholic Church has looked benignly on infanticide, for, in fa ct, the 
Church regularly condemned it as an exceedingly grave action. He im pli es that 
medieval law d id not consider the killing of infants to be as grave as the ki lli ng of 
adul ts. In fact, m e dieval law did regard infanticide as very grave, even t h ough it 
did not involve disturbing the king 's peace, or the social order as the k illing of 
adults did. Nonetheless, infanticide was a very grave crime and was anyth ing but a 
small misdemeanor . 
Weir notes that, in recent years, t here has been a great deal of pressure exerted 
by physicians, attorneys and various 'interest groups to change the laws p ro hibi t ing 
the killin g of infants and regulating t he withdrawal of life-sustaining medical 
treatments. Various physicians have expressed worry over the fact that n umerous 
handicapped unborn children are esca ping abortion and are being allowed to li ve. 
Weir discusses the views of ·leading pediatricians , pediatric surgeo ns and neo natol o· 
gists on the withdrawal of m edical tr~atments from infants with con gen ital il!· 
nesses. In ·general, he presents their views very accurately and precisely . In h iS 
discussion of t h e views of various legal scholars, he notes that som e attorneys are 
suggesti ng that handicapped newborns should be legally classified a s potenual 
persons and not have a legal right to life ascribed to them immediately afte r birth-
And these attorneys suggest that not all acts of involuntary euthanasia shou ld be 
consid ered as e ither acts of malice or negligence. 
Even though Weir has a rather clear understanding of the legal and historical 
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issues and current views, he adopts some ·of the most extreme ethical principles of 
the past decade to judge the morality of infanticide and neonatal euthanasia: He 
IS&erts that all newborns should be regarded only as potential persons, because 
they are indistinguishable from late term unborn children. They should also be 
regarded as only potential persons because they do not m eet all of Joseph Flet-
cher.'s "indicators of humanhood " when they are first born. Only when it is clear 
that ne~borns can meet these criteri·a should they be considered as possess ing all 
the rights of a person. He also holds that the right to life should only be con-
sidered as a prima facie right that can be nullified when other rights or duties are 
iudged to be more weighty . Weir claims that human life is not always a good and 
should not always and everywhere be seen as a benefit to newborns . Congenital 
illness can create such burdens that life can be a harm and death can be a benefit 
for some children. Weir argues correctly that medical treatments should be admin-
istered according to the "best interests " standar d , so that treatments are only 
administered when t hey are judged to be of benefit to the child. If treatments 
cannot alleviate the suffering caused by congenital illnesses and give only an 
e:tiatence marked by continuous suffering, then they do harm rather than good 
and should be withdrawn, according to Weir. He uses the principle of nonmale-
r~eence to support his claim that medical treatments which cannot cure, but only 
Pllliate congenital illnesses and only continue a painful existence, should be with-
drawn because they are doing harm rather than good. Since he de nies that there is 
any sigr 'ficance to the killing / letting die distinc tion , he concludes that deliberate , 
JIOiitive acts of intentional killing are justifiable in some circumstances. When 
eGntinued existence is determined to no longer be of benefit to a congenitally ill 
Dewborn because that existence is marked by intractable suffering, Weir holds that 
JIOiitive acts of direct killing should be undertaken because they will bring death 
~ftly and painlessly. This direct killing should be a group project which would 
lbelude the death-dispensing physicians, the NICU and the ethics committee of 
the hospital. Weir's principle implies that newborns diagnosed as having Lesch-
Nyhan or Tay Sachs disease should be intentionally kill ed by positive measures 
because the administration of medical treatments only causes them "harm" by 
COntinuing their painful existence. 
Weir asserts that he wants all clinical categories to be treated equally. But he 
h.eka away from that position and later holds that treatments should be optional 
for Various categories of patients for whom treatments should be obligatory. This 
ttception would seem to destroy his claim that he is concerned with assuring 
eqlla] treatment for newborns with the same clinical picture. 
. The author is eager to keep the courts as far away as possible from decisions to 
lfithdraw treatments from seriously ill newborns. Only if the physician and family 
and Institutional review board cannot come to an agreement on the treatment of a 
leriously ill newborn should the courts be allowed to intervene. His preference, 
however, is for physicians to have the liberty to treat handicapped newborns as 
they please, in consultation with the parents . · 
Weir never seems to give serious co'nsideration to the rights of newborns in his 
ditcussions. Even though he is a professor of religious studies, h e completely fails 
to Understand the nature of the sacredness of human life, for he sees human life as 
1 
-.!ue existing on the same scale as other values, even though higher up on the 
ll!ale. He assumes that death can be of benefit to some infants, and ignores the 
'totda of Chief Justice Weintraub: "Man, who knows nothing of death or nothing-
~· cannot possibly know whether that is so." Weir fails to see tha t the human 
latina is a spiritual creature and is set apart from all other material creatures which 
llletna that certain actions cannot be taken against the human being. Had Weir 
"derstood the nature of the sanctity of human life better, he probably never 
'touid have said that human life itself could become impossibly burdensome. ~s and ailments from which persons might suffer can create ' severe burde ns, 
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but life itself cannot becom e a bu rden as it is a gift and treasure from Gc 
Weir shows a complete ignorance of the traditional role of the phy tan as a 
healer /counselor, not .executioner. He invokes a complete paradox , at "the 
principle of nonmaleficence .. . call(s) for the intentional killing of an • treated, 
suffering infant." But how can a principle of not harming, require k il 1g - the 
ultimate harm one ·human being can do to another? He overlooks com r. · tely the 
advances in pain control. Practically every newborn can be kept comfo tble and 
relatively· pain-free. It seems that Weir 's real concern is for the suffer · ~ family 
and the frustrated medical staff. 
It has been stated that while there are "untreatable diseases, th L are no 
untreatable patients." Even though our technological armamentarium .1s failed 
us we still have the resources upon which physicians have relied for th u sands of ye~rs- empathy, support and compassion. Physicians are to enter in to . healing 
covenant with their patients , not only for the welfare of the patient, b t also for 
the benefit of the physician. In this covenant, the physician is to acco rr )any the 
patient either to his or her healing or death and not abandon the patien t long the 
way . It is necessary for the physician to do this so that he or she can • •clare m 
truth at the end of the relationship that he or she has acted responsi bJ · toward 
the patient and did not abandon the patient in frustration . Weir's prop< sals ulk 
mately make the physician a technologist who not only abandons t h ,• pattent 
when technological " fixes " are insufficient, but who also becomes a k tit er when 
technology fails. · . · r r 
We should not be surprised that Weir's defense of nonvoluntary eut h;w asta 0 
handicapped newborns has been put forth so boldly, for this formof eu thanasta 
has been practiced for years against the unborn . For more than a decade, the 
II · · self· unborn have had to pay the highest price in order to a ow our permts>tve, . 
oriented society to continue. The appearance of this book causes us to beheve 
that handicapped newborns will soon have to begin paying that price as ell. 
- Kathryn L. Moseley, M.D. 
St. Louis University Medical School 
show evidence confirming a prognosis c:>f a "horrible future." Meningomyelocele 
cases are simply not resolved in this way and the use of such a case suggests a bias. 
In a chapter quoting seven pediatric opinions, Weir accurately contrasts their 
views on selective nont reatm ent (aside from an inclination to parody the opinion 
of Koop), but he is less than satisfactory in his attempt to disti ll and define the 
issues in the current debate. 
Two chapters on the law and ·on criminal liability are very comprehensive 
reviews of the literature on these su bjects. A model fo r the development of a new 
law, based on the writings of Rober tson and others, aims at a satisfactory resolu-
tion of the current ambivalence in the opinions of courts responding to conflict 
cases. 
Weir defines as ethical options currently suggested by a review of the writings 
of ethicians of varying hues, the following: 
1) treat all nondying neonates; 
2) terminate the lives of selected nonpersons ; 
3) withhold treatment according to parental discretion ; 
4) withhold treatment according to quality-of-life projections ; 
5) withhold treatment judged not in the child 's best interest. 
The discussions of these various options is, in general, nonjudgmental and 
even-handed. There are many inferences drawn about individual viewpoints which 
are open to rebuttal. The most unsatisfactory poin ts in this chapter relate to 
Weir's taking seriously the repugnant and offensive views of "animal liberationist" 
Peter Singer. The inclusion of such views in an otherwise serious evaluation of 
Yllid perspectives is a source of unmitigated dismay. 
Weir is less persuasive in chapters relating to clinical applications than in his 
dlapters related to ethics. He is , of course, a professor of religious studies and can 
be excused for lapses related to the imprecision of h is own analysis (or that of his 
llledical consultants). 
II 
On balance, this is an intellectually honest appraisal of the elements of the 
CUrrent controversy . It includes pro-life perspectives without favoring them over 
..ti-life sources such as Duff; Joseph Fletcher, Singer, etc. This coincides with 
•bat is, no doubt, the author's intention, i.e., to produce a textbook-style cove~-
• lie Without polemics. Considering the book 's price, it might be better to check It 
OUt of the library , rather than buy it. 
h · · ·t f · ·elated to This book is far-reaching and compre ens•ve m 1 s coverage o Issues t k 
the care of handicapped newborns. This is both its strength and weakness . T he bOO 
contributes to a balanced presentation or' certain controversies, but it a lso con· 
tributes to a lack of resolution and an amorphousness in the discussion of these 
controversies. . . . stab-
The thorough treatment of the historical aspects of mfanttcide helps ~o e d 
lish the continuity of the present infanticide crisis with those crises of anctent all f 
presumedly less civilized cultures. ·There is a marked reluctance on the part 0 I 
. . f . 'd even tn society to admit that selective nontreatment can constttute m antiC! e, 
such flagrant cases as the Bloomington Baby Doe matter. . e 
While trying to be equally thorough in the discussion of the neonatal intenstVt· , 
care unit Weir mentions innumerable instances in which the issue of nontrea 
ment sho~ld never arise, ~nd makes of' them a mixed bag with true problem ~ases~ 
. . . I t ' F pie he cJtes Similarly his case reports are given pejorative reso u Ions. or exam , ed 
' . · · r J)ow Down 's syndrome case in which surgical correctiOn of duodenal atresia ts o_ . d 
"in ten days" by a transfer to a state institution. No one would sugges t thts k•nal 
· · D ' d ' th ' th t intesttn of management for a child with owns syn rome, WI or WI ou . al 
obstruction. Such a resolution of the problem tends to suggest that the s urgJ~ 
intervention was ill-advised. Similarly , a meningomyelocele case is not treat~~ 
dies within one week of transfer to a nursing home and is found, at autopsy, 
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- Eugene F. Diamond, M.D. 
Loyola University 
Stritch School of Medicine 
Fundamentals of Ethics 
John Finnis 
f:eor.lle town Uniuersity Press, Washington, D .C., 1983, 163 pp. 
Current debates in ethics and moral theology not infrequently lead to an 
where mutually irreconcilable theories and m ethods of decision-making 
._brought to bear on perplexing conflict situations and yield diverse and often 
... tradictory conclusions. There is a crying need for a systematic study of the 
.._elations of ethics and a thorough critique of the most significant contem-~ methodologies. In this relatively short work , John Finnis has undertaken 
task. Readers of his earlier work on Natural Law and Natural Rights will 
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anticipate detailed analysis, a close attention to classic authors an d 1mplex, 
finely wrought argument. They will not be disappointed in this work. 
The first chapter argues that the understanding we seek in ethics is ·actical 
One's understanding of human good is not derived from a theoretical y J Wiedge 
of what it is to be human, but from considering what would be wort .vhile to 
have and to be. What we do when we do ethics is display possibilities human 
fulfillment . This is not done in abstraction from human experience, bu erves to 
remind those engaged in the inquiry of their own experience and prac al, pre-
philosophical grasp of goods. Thus, the inquiry would proceed through l partici· 
pants ' examining critically whether the formulations offered adequa t• · corres· 
pond to and interpret that experience. In so doing, they may be led to r· n terpret 
that experience, and/or modify the interpretations offered. The basic rr, "/e is not 
from a theory of human nature to an abstract theory of practical n ·.o n, as a 
source of normativity outside and beyond practice, but to the na t t• ~ of the 
practical inquiry itself. 
The second chapter explores the relationship between desire, und ~ tand ing 
and human goods. The argument may be summarized in two main p< nts. Thel 
thesis to be challenged is that : 1) human ends are established indeper- lently of 
intelligence by "desire"; 2) the role of reason is limited to deliberating bout the 
means to attain these ends ; 3) to assert that X is a good is simply to a~ ~ rt that I 
experience a desire for X . The assertion is about my experiential state ... 1d that~ 
all. The counter-thesis is 1) being desirabl e is intrinsic to something , being 3 
human good (or end), but it is not simply its being desired or desi ra.Jle which 
constitutes it as worth pursuing; 2) the role of reason extends to und• ;-standing\ 
certain possibilities of activity, of shaping one 's identity through thi s a ·~ t ivity , of 
communicating with reality and with real persons through the activity ; 3 • t o assert 
that X is a good and, in some cases , a basic human good, is to asser t that X is 
objectively fulfilling. That is, it is not merely productive of an experiential state. 
but consists in a real achievement of human flourishing. The argum <"n t is per· 
suasive and the conclusion sound. There are, however, some points which could be 
debated. For example, the author places Bernard Lonergan among th ose who 
would hold the first thesis. I would suggest that this may be less th an fair to 
Lone rgan . The "intentional response" in which values are apprehended in Loner·' 
gan 's account are not mere emotive states which are produced. Rather, the in ten· 
tiona! response answers to what is intended, apprehended and represen ted. There 
may well be inadequacies in Lonergan 's account of value, but I am not co nvinced 
that grounding value in mere emotive states is one o( them . 
The author repeats and supports his well-known thesis that there are manY 
basic forms of human good, all equally or incommensurably basic and none 
reduceable to any or all of the others. The master principle of ethical reason ing 15 > 
this : make one's choices open to human fulfillment, i.e . , avoid unnecessary limita· 
tions on human fulfillment. 
On the basis of his positive th~sis, Finnis takes issue with utilitarianism , c.ons~) 
quentiaJism and especially with what has come to be called " proport io naltsm. 
The debate between the supporters of a "basic human goods " theory and " pro· I 
portionalism " has been going on for some time and Finnis 's contribu ti o n to tb~ 
controversy. is .im~orta~t . There are two background point~ worthy of spectad 1 
note. The f1rst IS h1stoncal. The author argues that the doctrme cannot be foun 
in Aquinas where some authors have claimed to find it. This, I believe, is correc~ 
The second is theoretical, namely , that the dichotomy between " teleol og ical" 30 
"deontological" the9ries is misplaced and confusing. This also is a valid po int. 
There are, nevertheless , some features in the argument which may need fur ther 
clarification. Finnis responds to a criticism of his earlier work, namely, t hat be 
treats consequences as of no account. One of the intermediary principles he 
proposes is , " ... do not overlook the foreseeable bad consequences o f your 
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choices." He rejects the "irrational extrapolation " of this into utilitarian or 
proportionalist "rationalizations. " But it seems rather unclear what would be 
entailed in "not overlooking" bad consequences. The precise place of conse-
que~ces in ethical thinking needs to be explained more fully. 
In his perceptive and closely argued critique of "9roportionalism," Finnis takes 
the supporters of the latter theory to mean by "consequences" any states of 
affairs which may arise by any concatenation of eve,nts following on the act. 
Would proportionalists accept this account of their position? For example , how 
would they answer the question: should Socrates help to liquidate Leon? If I 
understand thejr position correctly, they would not proceed by attempting an 
etaluative weighing of the event of Leon 's death against the event of Socrates's 
death (which would probably be the penalty for his refusal to cooperate) . Rather, 
they would ask whether or not there was a proportionate reason for participating 
in the killing of Leon. It might be argued that such a killing would undermine the 
Yllue pursued, i.e ., I ife, and furthermore, that there is no intrinsic connection 
between killing Leon and preserving Socrates's life, since. the latter would be the 
illltcome of a distinct free choice by others. This may not be a very good argu-
lllent, but it is not the same as a mere weighing of disparate events against each 
other. Some of the issues in the debate seem to be clouded by terminological 
diaparities. For example, Richard McCormick has written that a life-saving ampu-
tation is an imperfect act. Finn is counters that this is not an imperfect act at all ; it 
I in no way a doing of evil. "Act" for Finn is, appears to mean that which is 
~fied by the object directly intended. In this sense, the life-saving amputation 
• an act of saving I i fe. McCormick means by "act, " the act itself, together with its 
attendant implications which include the loss of the I imb. However, the differ-
ences are certainly deeper than terminology . 
There is a final chapter on free choice, ultimate human destiny and God. 
The merit of the work is, above all , that it compels the reader to think very 
hard, to .resist obfuscation and to confront some of the most fundamental qu es-
tiona. Both on this count and for the positive theory presented, it merits serious 
attention from anyone concerned with the enterprise of ethics. 
- Brian V. Johnstone 
Th e Catholic University of America 
The Way ·of the Lord Jesus 
Volume One: Christian Moral Principles 
Germain Grisez 
"-nciacan Herald Press, 1434 West 5 1st Street, Chicago, Jll. , 1983, xxxiii + 971 
liP .• 135. 
Va ~or more than two decades , Catholic moral theology has been i~ disarray. 
be tican. II called for a major renewal in moral theology . Shallow legal!~~ was to 
d IVOJded. Scholarly presentations of moral theology were to exh1b1t more 
early how Catholic moral teaching is grounded in scripture , how moral precepts 
are rooted in divine love; in "the obligation to bring forth fruit in charity for the 
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life of the World" (Decree on Priestly Formation, no. 16). 
Unfortunately , renewal in moral theology became confused with m 
things. The Church lives in the world , and in the years after Vatican II , 
was passing through chaotic times. The spiritual chaos of those yea r, 
many good and bad things. Rich ideas of the Gospel were sometimes ac 
with baser ideas drawn from inadequate contemporary philosophies. ' 
relativism and subjectivism were confused with freedom and Christian 
ism . Efforts to find liberation from unjust structures and from modes o · 
which hinder growth in love and truth were used to justify hostility to 
mate authority in Christ's Church, and to defend forms of dissent inc < 
with the liberating duties of one who has found Christ teaching and r u, 






~ rsonal · 
h inking 
.e legi ti· 
.1patible 
1g in his 
This book brings order to a field that has been in chaos . The au th o ·eveals a 
tranquil mastery of the immense literature that had to be analyzed : write a 
balanced and dee ply satisfying synthesis of Catholic moral principles to 
Thoughtful Catholics have been disturbed at the great harm don e b :. the con· 
fusion in moral thinking experienced in the Church over recent y ea r Young 
people find neither light to see nor courage to follow faithfully the ex c il ent bu t 
difficult requirem ents of th e gospel , if their teachers are uncertain o r .he most 
bas ic principles of Catholic living. And many teachers of the young ]· ·tve been 
profoundly uncertain, because the debates on basic principles among co m peting 
moralists seemed to be in no way resolved. Catholics in every area of p rofessional 
life , certainly not least in medicine, have seen many of their peers turn 1 despair 
from seeking light from Catholic moral teaching. Everywhere they en .. ountered 
contradictions which darkened, rather than illumined , the spiritual diso rde r of the 
times. 
The many citations of Pope John Paul II in this book, remind the reader of 
how important this pope has been to restoring clarity in Catholic moral t hinking. 
He has shown great courage and warmth in presenting the central p r inciples of 
Chris tian life, principles which are, in a way , difficult and which alway s confront 
the worldly mind and imagination , but which are essential to the bas ic ttberation 
of the hum an spirit. Unde r his pastoral direction, recent world synods o f bishops 
have shown the Church 's firm commitment to the principles of Catholic thinking 
which have been rejected by a prominent school of dissenting theologi ans. He has 
made the witness of the authentic teaching of the faith and morals fa r clea rer in a 
world needing such bracing support. 
But scholarly work of the most rigorous kind was also needed, espec ially in the 
a rea of Catholic moral principles , the area spl endidly covered by this book. 
Attacks on received Catholic moral teaching have been so unsettling, not because 
of their profound depth but because of their scope and their constancy . One weak 
argument afte r another was brought forth over the last decades to argue that the 
ins isten t voice of the teaching Church need not be accepted in moral m atters, even 
wh en the Magiste rium was confirming immemorial and most firm teach ing bf the 
Church . One bad argument after another was brought forth to persuade t he fa ith· 
ful that mortal sin is not so serious or likely a danger. To take sin as se ri ously as the 
saints did was looked down upon as a form of negative thinking . It was not the 
forc e of any of the arguments which did the most damage; it was th e confusion 
ge ne rated by so many w e ll-publicized voices. People began to get th e opinion that 
there must be something valid to this dissent , if it appeared so insiste ntly in so 
m a ny forms . 
Grisez has done the patient good work of a great moralist on two fro nts. 0~ 
the one hand , he shows that the arguments used against the received teach tng 0 
the Church (we refer here to teachings insistently proposed by the Holy Fath ~r 
with the bishops) are , in fact, not good arguments. He shows immense pat ience 10 
working through the many forms in which radical dissent has expressed itself. He 
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is always clear and always presents the argum ents o f others with fairn ess and 
patience. · 
His second task was more important : the presentation of a positive moral 
theology m the spirit of Vatican II. In doing t his , he reveals how much creative 
and excellent work has been done in the las t decades also. Dissent has driven those 
mo~al th~~logians who have been faithful to Catholic principles to think through 
their _POSitiOns more _care fully , to do the work that Jo~n Paul II h as required of 
them. t? show w1th mtellectual rigor a nd with human attractiveness the "biblical 
fou~dabons, the ethical grounds, and the personalistic reasons " ( Familiaris Con · 
10rt10, n. 31) for Church teaching in moral matters. 
. This as~onishing book is a large , systematic treatise of all the questions touch· 
1011 Cathohc moral principles. The author begins by showing why Vatican II called 
~or a renewal in moral theology ; and the kind of renewal it called for . He studies 
10 depth all the live questions of the day -questions of the freedom of man 
&enerally, and of freedom of conscience; the attractiveness (and the human disas· 
trou~ness) of modern forms of subjectivism, cultural relativism , and emotivism . 
. HIS .~riticism _ of t_he ;~r~ of moral theory favored by most dissenting theolo· :-ns ( ~ro~ort1onahsm ) IS clear, penetrating, fair- and devastating. One who 
ads th1s Will understand well why Cardinal Ratzinger told the American bishops 
that proportionalism is radically unacceptable. 
Even mo · · th ·t · Ca . re precious IS e pos1 1ve exposition of the central structure of a 
thohc moral vision. Grisez's moral theory draws heavily on Aquinas and the 
central Cath 1· t d"t" B t h" k ' heal! o I~ ra I 10n. ~ IS wor states the received positions with great 
ness, creatively respondmg to all the new questions wh1ch have arisen in 
lll~rn times and have demanded clear answers. His position avoids every kind of ~IS~, phys~calism, or minimalism, but it defends magnificently the bracing 
lot thohc teachmg on moral absolutes . It is based entirely on the requirements of 
. e, and of respect for the human person. But it develops this without any falling 
lllto I t" · · · 
. rea IVIsm , or pretendmg to fmd any conflict between the transcendent dig· 
llity of the human person and the human duty to respect the demands of truth 
•d goodness. 
"ru:is chapters on si.~, especially mortal sin , and on related questions (such as 
~m~ntal_ opt10n ) are models of forceful clarity. Patterns of thinking in 
eoufl~ct Situations are traced out with great precision. 
llta With Vatican II and contemporary concerns generaliy, he wished to remind us 
t the moral life aims at the fullness of love. The pursuit of Christian hotiness 
flllnot be separated from a sound moral treatise. Here there is much creative work 
Ill the q t " f · . . . c.n. . ues 10n o vocatiOn , on grace, on the d1stmct1ve characteristics of a 
el f<t•a_n m~ral_ity, on the beatitudes_ and the sacraments. These chapters are full 
P ec1ous ms1ghts. It IS true that 1n some of them certain novel theories are 
tleeented which will deservedly receive some sharp criticism . 
-!:t Grisez writes always · as a · respo~sible Catholic theologian . If he, on any 
Jlle . on, feels that theoretical explanations he has given might lead the reader to 
Jotntlcal iudgm~n~ ~hich would contradict Church directives , he takes care to 
llld! out the l:m•tat10_ns of the t?eologia~ 's authority. "However, if my theory 
, he Church s teachmg should m a particular case lead to inconsistent conclu· 
• I would follow and urge othE>rs to follow the Church's teaching rather than 
own theory " ( p . 299 ). 
"-His last t";,o chapters are by t_hem~lves wo~th the substantial cost of this book. 
Cf Pter 35 ( The Truth of Chnst L1ves m H1s Church") speaks with great clarity 
the Church 's role as a moral teacher. First, he gives a splendid presentation of 
llleaning and applicat ion of the Church 's infallibility in moral matters. Then 
l~aks of the reasons why the Catholic faith has always required- and must 
Ire- religious assent to and personal life in accord with , authoritative Ca t h · 
llloral teaching, even when this is not presented in an infallible mode. 
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Chapter 36 is a splendid analysis and critiq ue of contemporary : 
dissent . 
•logical 
While the book is somewhat int imidati ng by its sheer size, the au th o 
every editoria l sk ill to make it easy to use. Each chapter is divided ia • 
" Questions ." The . briefest answer to the question is signified in t he te >-
print. Numbered paragraphs , in larger print, provide answers to the q u 
suffici ent detail for the ordinary student. More detail ed analyses and ex J 
are given in finer print. The summaries at the end of each chapter. are he. 
table of contents itself is suf fici ently detai led to provide a preliminary 








This publication is one which no one seriously interested in con t• 
mural questions can ignore. 
1porary 
-Ronald D . Lawler, 0 . .M. Cap. 




Material appearing be low is th ought to t· o f par· 
ticular int erest to Linacre Qu arterly reader because 
o f its m oral, religious, or philo soph ic co n >nl. Tht , 
m edical literature constitutes th e primar~ hut nol 
the sole so urce o f such material. In ge nera l. •bstracls 
are intended to reflect the subs tan ce o f th a original 
article. Co ntributio ns and comme nts fro r readers 
are invited . (E. G. Lafore t, M.D., 2000 Wa<hington 
S t., Newton Lower Falls. MA 021 62) 
--------------------------------------------------------
To have suggested, a decade ago, 
that fiscal matters had any major rele-
vance to medical ethical dialogue 
would have been considered crass at 
best. Today, in the era of cost-contain-
ment and DRGs, the situation has 
changed dramatically. Witness the fol-
lowing trio of items. 
Owen D: Medicine, morality and the 
market. Lancet pp. 30-31 7 July 
1984. 
Physicians have been major econ-
omic decision-makers in health-care 
systems. The emphasis, howe ver, has 
been on treatment of sickness rather 
than on the maintenance of heal th. 
This has led to an enormous expendi-
ture of capital without a proportionate 
yield. In the USA, for example, life-
expectancy of adults has not increased 
between 1950, when the national med-
ical care budget was $12 billion. and 
1982, when it was $275 bil don. Re-. 
sources must be redistribu ted ustng, 
inter alia, self-help programs for differ· 
ent populations of patients. An agiO 
population requires a reorientation ol 
attitudes on the part of physiciaJJS. 
" The traditional, moral values of medi· 
cine should be a counterwei ght to t)ll 
me chan is t ic , tec hnological, cost· 
effectiveness of t he market place." 
Wall CA: Economics and ethics: iSS~ 
of the eighties. Am J Sw• 
148:186-190 Aug 1984. 
Massively escalating health ca; 
costs resulted in deregulation of 1
111 industry. This has resulted in a smal bf 
market place for surgeons ~ th is ca~ .. 
increased only by expandmg the 1~ 
cations f?r surgery . T~is econo .~ 
issue obvwusly resul ts m an etht ~ 
conflict for the surgeon. The new read 
ties require a new marketing approa 
si nce the traditional major marketing . 
tool, capability, is no longer sufficient . 
However, the surgeon still " perceives 
ethical issues in terms of patient wel-
fare." 
Johnson DE: Life, death, and the dol-
lar sign : medical ethics and cost 
containment. JAMA 252:223-224 
13 July 1984. 
With retrospect ive reimbursement 
th~re was generally no problem with 
ernng on the side of active treatment 
even when extremely expensive and 
W~en the prognosis was very doubtful ; 
third-party payers had no direct voice 
~n how funds were expended. Prospec-
ttve financing has changed the scenario 
dramatically, and the incenti ve to limit 
expenses raises distinct ethi cal prob-
lems for the physician who is now 
subject to pressures fo r' cost contain-
rent on the one hand and t he fear of 
ega~ liability on the other. Some type 
of shared responsibili ty and patient a~vocacy , as by a disinterested com-
ll_llttee, is needed to assist the ph ysi-
etan to make these diffi cul t decisions. 
. * 
* * * * 
kass LR: The case for mortality. Am 
Scholar 52:173-191 Spring 1983. 
t' Much research aimed at the retarda-
•on ~f aging is now underway. Serious :st•o_n~ have been raised about the 
to :b•ht_y of this effort. Were success 
tant ac~1eve~ , there would be impor-
A SOCiologiC and economic res ul ts. q~ from this, however, t here are 
in:t•ons _ about whether or not an 
itseJ~e m longevity is desi rable in 
si b! · Boredom and tedium are pes-
ioU:n Prospect_s. Furth~rmore, the ser-
("M ess . of hfe requtres a terminus. 
Ion °~hty makes life matter.") Man ~ not for length of days, but for 
•~ cter, vi rtue, and moral excel -oqJce " It . it i · IS probably no accident tha t ~-generation whose intelligentsia 
that •m the meaninglessness of life 
atio embarks on its indefinite prolong-
lltesc n an_d that seeks to cure the empti-
or hfe by extending it ." 
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Lasagna L : A duty to die? The 
Sciences (NY Acad Sci) 24:7-8 
1984. 
The increased life expectancy re-
sulting from medical advances has pro-
duced the problem of large numbers of 
chronica lly ill elders who require an 
inordinate expenditure of medical 
resources. This is the case even though 
some have argued that sickness is not 
an inevitable concomitant of aging. 
The chall enge of equitable distri bu t ion 
of health care resources in this situa-
tion is enormous. Governor Lamm of 
Colorado recently asserted that the old 
and sick have a du ty to di e and get out 
of the way. It is obvious t ha t society 
"already prefers youth and vigor to 
age and wisdom . Will we move from 
social neglect of t he elderly to age-
adjusted genocide?" 
Robertson GS: Ethical dilemmas of 
brain failure in the elderly. Brit 
Med J 287 :1 775-1777 10 Dec. 
1983. 
Senile dementia and its resulting 
loss of dignity is greatly feared by the 
elderly. Ethical guidelines are needed 
so that managemen t of such demented 
pat ients is sensi ble , ethical , and in con-
formance - as far as possible - with 
the earlier expressed wishes of the 
pa tien t. 
Drane JF: Competency to give an 
informed consent: a model for 
making clinical assessments. JAMA 
252:925-927 17 Aug 1984. 
Assess men t of competency to give 
informed consent is complex. There is 
obviously no stan dard which is uni ver-
sally applicable. A standard of compe-
tency based on a sliding scale of dan -
gerousness (standards 1, 2, 3) provi des 
some clarification of the issue. 
(For reference) : The American College 
of Physicians' Ad Hoc Committee 
on Medical Ethics: American Col-
lege of Physicians Ethics Manual . 
Part 1: History of Medical Ethics, 
the physician and the patient, the 
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